THE BUSINESS OF DECEPTION
by Professor Revilo P. Oliver (Liberty Bell, January 1988)
THE WHOLE BUSINESS of a nation's intelligence agency is duplicity and deceit. Its primary function is to ascertain, by various kinds of espionage, the secret offensive and defensive power and plans of the nation's present or potential enemies. An equally important function is to prevent those enemies from ascertaining its nation's secrets.
The agency must first of all protect its own secrets, especially its most valuable sources of information. To do this, it must often deceive the very people on whose behalf it is working. When a person of very high rank in the German government -- probably Admiral Canaris, who was almost certainly a Jew disguised as a Greek -- delivered to the head of the British cryptological service one of Germany's new cipher machines, the Enigma, which the Germans believed proof against analysis, the fact was concealed by more or less plausible cover-stories told to British officers, necessarily of high rank, who, after the war began, had to be entrusted with the secret that German messages were being read. One tale, which was still being told when I last heard, a few years ago, was a romance about sagacious Polish factory workers who deduced that small machine-parts they were producing must be intended for enciphering machines and heroically had them smuggled to Great Britain.
When we ambushed and killed Japan's greatest military commander, Admiral Yamamoto, the pilots of the fifteen or twenty fighter planes that plunged from a maximum altitude on the Admiral's big command plane had to be told precisely when and where they were to expect him, but they were not told that we knew because we were reading the most secret of the Japanese naval codes and so had a complete and precise schedule of Yamamoto's tour of inspection. The destruction of Japan's greatest military mind, and the demoralizing effect on the Japanese of the loss of their venerated commander, whom they thought virtually invincible, was a great victory, but it could have been a Pyrrhic one. It was achieved at great risk, not in combat, for Yamamoto's plane was practically a sitting duck to the attackers, but to our strategy in the war in the Pacific.
If the Japanese suspected that our success in ambushing Yamamoto had been made possible by our reading of their "most secure" means of high-level and ultra-secret communications, they, of course, would have immediately changed that four-digit doubly-enciphered code. And if they came to the conclusion that the Americans must have broken that code by cryptanalytic techniques, they would construct their new code on entirely different principles. If you have even a superficial knowledge of cryptology, you will appreciate the magnitude of the risk taken when Yamamoto was assassinated. A new edition of the four-digit code could resist the best efforts of cryptanalysts for a month, perhaps two months, during which time our knowledge of Japanese movements and plans would depend only on their five-digit code, used for communications below the highest level (i.e., tactical rather than strategic messages) -- unless that, too, were replaced. But a new code enciphered on an entirely new principle might be invulnerable to analysis for months and months, perhaps a year or more, during which we would have to fight the Japanese without knowing the orders given their major forces and the strategic plans that could be logically inferred from them. Furthermore, the cryptanalysts were chilled by the knowledge that they knew how to construct a code that would be absolutely unbreakable with the analytic resources then available.
That is why the pilots of the attacking planes and all American officers, no matter how high their rank, except the very few who necessarily knew, were systematically deceived by the most plausible lie that could be invented in the circumstances. There was a network of observers, most of them amateurs, on the coast of Australia called "Coastwatchers," who did transmit useful information obtained by watching such Japanese movements as they could discern from the coast. For the cover-story, the "Coastwatchers" were expanded and given adroit native agents in territories occupied by the Japanese -- imaginary natives who, from their hiding places, observed Japanese movements with their high-powered binoculars and reported them by the radio apparatus with which they were imaginatively equipped. They had seen Yamamoto's plane take off and, from the direction of its flight, conjectured to which Japanese base it was bound!
It was correctly assumed that Japanese espionage would learn the story that was told to the American officers, and the Japanese were content with it. They did not change the four-digit code, except by the regular periodic changes of keys and of one stage of encipherment, thus scarcely exercising the American cryptanalysts. And it was our ability to read the four-digit code that made possible many of our victories; for example, we sank the greatest battleship ever built, the Yamato, by taking it by surprise in Japanese coastal waters and launching an intensive and all-out attack, with all the submarines and bombers we could muster, before it reached its rendezvous with the squadrons of ships that would have shielded it from such attacks. But so fixed is the habit of deception that five or six years later, after the surrender of Japan and, what is more important, after it was generally known that our cryptanalysts had read the diplomatic messages sent by the system that we called the "Purple machine," an American admiral told the old cover-story, invented to deceive most American officers at the time, that adroit Korean spies in Japan had informed us about the movements of the Yamato.
I have given this example to show you that successful deception of the very army or navy an intelligence agency serves may be the equivalent of victory in a pitched battle or even an entire campaign. And even if there is no urgent motive, deception to conceal the purpose or effect of intelligence work becomes habitual, almost instinctive.
The greatest danger to intelligence agencies is that of being penetrated by double-agents, now commonly called 'moles,' traitors or disguised aliens in the service of the enemy. Under present conditions, following the collapse of the morale of our race, it is probable that no White nation or country could make its intelligence agencies proof against such penetration -- not even if it really tried.
In Britain, no longer Great, the minority of Englishmen who still hope their nation has a future have been amazed and dismayed by revelations that 'moles' were deeply entrenched in MI5 (the division that is the very heart of British Military Intelligence) before, during, and after the suicidal war against Germany. And what was most distressing of all, the traitors were well-educated men of Aryan ancestry, whose comparatively prosperous parents had sent them to British public schools and one or the other of the two great universities. One comparatively recent shock came from the belated disclosure that the respected and knighted Anthony Blunt had been a traitor in the service of the Soviet when he was in MI5. He was also a homosexual pervert, like all but one of the 'moles' previously identified. See Andrew Boyle's The Climate of Treason (2d edition, London, Hodder & Stoughton, 1980).
Even more shocking was a recent book by Chapman Pincher, Their Trade is Treachery, which is the subject of an article in the September issue of the British periodical, Private Eye.
The ostensible purpose of the article, anonymous but obviously written by a man who has been in the inner core of MI5, is to question and deny Pincher's allegation that the late Sir Roger Hollis (another pervert), who had been the director-general of MI5, had been a traitor in the service of the Soviet. The author affirms that Hollis was not a 'mole,' and is content to say no more than that the evidence against him, set forth by Pincher, was obtained by "scrabbling in the dust." He thus admits the authenticity of the evidence, but denies its significance and the interpretation put upon it. On this basis, i.e., that the evidence was not fabricated, it will follow that Hollis, if not a traitor, was more gullible and less ruthless than the commander of a national intelligence agency has any right to be. Now this is quite possible, but for a reason the author oddly refrains from mentioning, although he probably hoped that some of his readers would discover it for themselves.
He attacks Pincher's book by stating, no doubt correctly, that Pincher, a journalist, obtained his information from a former officer of MI5, Peter Wright, who was paid 31,000+ pounds for it in a deal that was arranged and perhaps financed by a very wealthy Jew who grew up in England and whom the stupid British even raised to the peerage as Lord Rothschild. The purpose of the transaction and the publication was to direct suspicion against the deceased Hollis and thus divert it from Rothschild, who had, during the years in question, been a ranking member of MI5, second only to Hollis in authority, and who, incredible as it may seem, had with him as a fellow official the Jewess who became his wife.
The anonymous author thinks it highly significant that although Rothschild had, from his student days at Cambridge, been an intimate friend of some of the foul traitors already exposed, and associated with all of them, he is not even mentioned in Pincher's book. The author could have added that the fact is even more significant because, entirely aside from any question of 'moles' and treason, Pincher's book necessarily deals with the operations of MI5 in the entire period during and after the war when Hollis was the director, and the position and great influence of Rothschild in the agency must have made it very hard to avoid mentioning him. Andrew Boyle, in the book I cited above, has to mention Rothschild several times and even mentions his association with a notorious traitor, Philby, in an operation that MI5 was able to carry out in Paris because Lord Rothschild enlisted the coöperation of the members of his international family who resided in France. The obvious explanation of Pincher's thunderous silence is that Rothschild sponsored and probably subsidized Pincher's book.
The immediate occasion of the article in Private Eye is the publication in Australia of a book, Spycatcher, by the Peter Wright who supplied the information used by Pincher. It is said that in that book, which I have not seen, Wright incidentally reveals so much of the dirty tactics and potentially disastrous strategy of the treacherous government that herded the British people into the Jews' war against Germany and liquidated the British Empire that no reader can escape the conclusion that that government was British only in name. The present government of Little Britain made frantic efforts to prevent the publication of that book or to suppress it in Australia, and is now trying to prevent copies of it from entering England, fearing lest Wright's disclosures occasion such a shock that the brains of many Englishmen might start to operate. Some believe that distribution of Spycatcher in England would precipitate the fall of the government of Prime Ministress Maggie Thatcher, a mannequin dressed and posed by Saachi & Saachi, the advertising agency of two members of Rothschild's holy tribe who crawled into England from Iraq around 1950 and promptly became outrageously wealthy (see Liberty Bell, July 1986, pp. 1-7).
The anonymous author reports that Wright's book contains "all sorts of things too embarrassing for the government to allow," and that it would produce a "backlash" that "would affect Lord Rothschild himself and even Chapman Pincher (who, interestingly enough, supports the government's attempts to ban Wright's book)." One assumes that Rothschild would be affected because he, although not a member of the present "British" Cabinet, composed of Jews plus a few spavined individuals who are at least partly English, is, behind the scenes, one of the directors of the show in which Maggie performs. As for the journalist, he would have to explain why -- and for what consideration -- he violated one of the conditions under which, according to our author, Wright gave him the information used in his book. Pincher let his readers assume that his unmasking of poor Hollis completed the shameful story, but Wright, although a recipient of largesse from Rothschild, had stipulated that Pincher was to demand a full-scale investigation of treason in MI5, which, he must have known, would disclose much more. Nota bene.
Now we are told emphatically that Wright, although looking for more 'moles' in MI5, expresses no faintest hint of suspicion when he mentions Rothschild, although the Jew was the member of MI5 whose record most invited suspicion, given the associations I mentioned above and the undisputed fact that until he jumped into the pseudo-conservative government now in power, he had been one of the Communists' "fellow travelers." One could suppose that Wright might have been reluctant to bite the hand of his rich benefactor, but the author has a different explanation.
Rothschild was educated at Harrow and Cambridge, but Wright did not attend a British public school and presumably attended what is called a "council school" in Britain, the counterpart of an American public school. That means, of course, that Wright's parents could not afford to give him a good education. Therefore, says our author, "Almost from the first moment they met, Wright worshipped at Rothschild's feet. Some of the most remarkable passages in Spycatcher bear witness to the hero worship which the low-born Wright had for his wealthy, aristocratic colleague -- and for Lady Rothschild, too.... Wright was dazzled by Rothschild, who, he believed, could never be wrong. Rothschild developed the friendship carefully."
Very well, but at this point, my reader, you will ask whether Wright, in 1987, was still so dazzled and naïf that he was certain that his "aristocratic" Jewish hero would be immune to suspicion in the thorough and really searching investigation of MI5 that he demanded. And you will wish, as I do, that we could read and ponder the passages in which Wright exhibits his "hero worship."
The former member of the inner core of MI5 proceeds in his article to absolve Rothschild of suspicion that he was a Soviet 'mole' on the ground that his Communist inclinations and allegiance were open and notorious when he was a ranking member of Military Intelligence.
He then tells us that Rothschild, "while in MI5 argued strongly that any important information which came to Britain through the code-breaking operation at Bletchley [Hall, where the secret British cryptanalytic agency was housed] (1) should be made available to the Russians ... He openly threatened, if the information was not made available, to hand it over himself." (My italics.)
(1. Let me anticipate an objection that may occur to you. Bletchley Hall is chiefly known, since its secrets were partly divulged, for its reading of most of the Germans' most confidental messages. It is likely that Rothschild, as a high-ranking member of his internationally ubiquitous nation, knew that all German military and diplomatic plans were being routinely betrayed to the Soviet by Admiral Canaris, assisted by German traitors (on whom see the terrible book by General Remer, Verschwörung und Verrat um Hitler, reviewed by Dr. Weber in Liberty Bell, June 1987, pp. 52-58; available from Liberty Bell Publications). It is probable that Canaris had also supplied the Soviet with one of Germany's "Enigma" machines. Why, then, should Rothschild insist that information from Bletchley be transmitted to the Russians? He had excellent reasons: (a) The British intercept stations obtained many German radio messages on the Western front that were beyond the range of the Soviet stations, and these could give the Soviets information they could use against Britain, which Judaeo-Communists, of course, intended to destroy, although in the circumstances they hated Germany even more at the moment. (b) The cryptanalysts at Bletchley Hall were reading the secret messages of many other nations, notably Japan, Portugal (a very important source), Spain, France (both the legitimate French government in Vichy and the insurrection headed by the egotistic General de Gaulle), Italy, Sweden, Norway, Turkey, and no doubt others, all slated for eventual destruction by the Judaeo-Communists. Most of these messages were obtained by intercept stations outside the range of the Soviet stations, and even if those messages were intercepted by secret Soviet listening posts within range, why should Soviet cryptanalysts have to do work the stupid British would do for them?)
That does it! Of course, Rothschild was not a mole: he was a python. And it obviously follows that when that threat was made, if not long before, Roger Hollis, the director-general of MI5, had an imprescriptible duty to order, as he had the legal power and, indeed, obligation to do, the immediate arrest of Rothschild and the Jewess who was then either the Jew's mistress or wife, and their detention for the duration of the war in the prison at Brixton, in which were then illegally incarcerated Admiral Domville, Captain Ramsay (a member of Parliament!), and a number of other patriotic Englishmen who had voiced disapproval of condemning thousands and thousands of Englishmen and Englishwomen to death in war in order to punish the Germans for disobedience to Yahweh's Master Race of world-destroyers. The patriotic Englishmen had been kidnapped, in defiance of all British law and usage, at the orders of Winston Churchill, the half-English pensioner of the Jews, who had made him Prime Minister. The imprisonment of the Rothschilds would have been a legal and indeed obligatory use of the power every intelligence agency necessarily possesses to avert betrayal of its secrets by a member who is discovered to be loyal to another country, whether or not that country happens to be an ally at that moment. For that matter, although intelligence agencies cannot operate with military discipline, they, no less than the regular army, cannot tolerate violation of the orders of a superior officer, and have their equivalent of the court martial that immediately follows such an offence in an army that is not a sham.
Since the anonymous author refrains from mentioning this obvious fact, he can offer no explanation of Hollis's gross dereliction. Was he a traitor, as Pincher claimed, so that he protected the Rothschilds, as he, according to Pincher, protected Anthony Blunt, even long after he knew Blunt to be a traitor? Or was he, like Wright in our author's opinion, overawed by the vast wealth of Rothschild and his international family? Was he, also relatively "low-born," taken in by Rothschild's simulation of the manners and culture of the British aristocracy?
All these are obvious possibilities, but, assuming that Hollis was not himself a traitor, I incline to the view that he took no action because he believed the situation simply hopeless and irremediable. It was axiomatic in old-line intelligence agencies that while they had to use Jews for espionage, since the Jews have colonies in all countries and are loyal to none, and are therefore settled in many positions to which no goy spy, however talented, could attain without great difficulty and grave risk, agencies must make sure they are using Jews without being used by them. Knowingly to admit a Jew to the inner workings of the agency was so suicidal that the agency might as well fold up and go out of business. It is noteworthy that this common sense rule was first breached by the Germans in the first part of this century, when Kaiser Wilhelm II insisted on making his "dear friend," one of the Warburgs, the real head of German Military Intelligence. (2) Of course, so cunning are the versipellous Jews that they can sometimes nullify the usual precautions. The best known example is a Jew from Russia who masqueraded as an Irishman named Sidney Reilly and, by an elaborate ploy, wriggled into British Military Intelligence. With the secret help of his fellow tribesmen, he attained such success as a spy that he was put in charge of British espionage in Russia at the time that his race captured the Russian Empire in 1917-1918.
(2. No one seems to have tried to guess how much this Warburg contributed to the defeat of Germany in 1918. It could be argued with only a little sophistry that he did procure the defeat of Germany in 1945, long after his death, for Canaris was his protégé).
Furthermore, Hollis may have felt helpless. He had legally the necessary powers, but he could be removed at will by the Prime Minister and even imprisoned by his successor as head of MI5, perhaps Rothschild himself, who could then use the authority which it had been Hollis's duty to use against him! Hollis may have known what the Jews would induce or order Churchill to do, if Hollis offended the ennobled Sheeny. As a matter of fact, Andrew Boyle reports that Hollis was harassed and browbeaten by Harold Macmillan, when that louche poseur, who may well have been a Soviet agent himself, was Prime Minister and could not cover up entirely the Profumo scandal. (3)
(3. John Profumo, of obscure ancestry, was Secretary of State for War in Macmillan's cabinet. He shared a high-class whore, named Christine Keeler, with Eugene Ivanov, a Soviet Naval Attaché and, ex officio, an agent of Soviet espionage. Whether Profumo intentionally or fatuously communicated military secrets to the Soviet through the Keeler woman was never determined, but it was widely suspected that he had. An Englishman named Ward, thought to be a "free-lance" operator engaged in ascertaining information he could sell to the Soviet rather than an employee of the Soviets, did at least try to use the versatile Christine to elicit military secrets from Profumo. The scandal was quieted, presumably on Macmillan's orders, by disgracing Profumo and forcing his resignation on the ground that he had lied when speaking in the House of Commons, thus violating what had been a rigid ethical standard when Members of Parliament were gentlemen and thus required to have personal honor. The incident occasioned a memorable limerick, still quoted, although the scandal is almost forgotten:
"Profumo, you dope," said Christine,
"You've wrecked the whole Party machine.
"To lie with a nude isn't lewd,
"But to lie in the House is obscene.")
Such is the article in Private Eye, ostensibly written to clear both the dead Hollis and the living Rothschild of the suspicion of having been 'moles.' But if you have the kind of pertinaciously suspicious mind that comes from familiarity with the operations of intelligence services, you will consider what the article has actually accomplished:
1. It has focused attention on the presence of Jews in MI5, which probably startled many Englishmen, accustomed to past identification of members of their own race as traitors in Military Intelligence. Many Britons, no doubt, have just taken it for granted that their intelligence services were controlled by members of their own nation.
2. It has focused attention on Rothschild in MI5. To be sure, he was mentioned by Boyle, who, however, first mentions him as a member of the band of rich and pro-Communist youngsters who called themselves The Apostles when they were undergraduates at Cambridge, most of whom later became notorious as traitors or perverts or both. Boyle remarks, however, that Rothschild seemed more interested in fast automobiles (he was known for driving his imported Mercedes at 100 miles per hour) and fast living, ostentatiously addicted to "social" pleasures, rather than to political interests. That seemed to exculpate him, since few readers would remember that it was precisely such a cover-personality that enabled the notorious Sorge to be the Soviet spy in Japan who, it could be argued, caused the defeat of Germany by assuring Stalin that he could safely withdraw and use against Germany the huge armies he was maintaining on the border of Manchuria.
3. Furthermore, by proving that Rothschild was not a 'mole,' but openly and notoriously a champion of Communist Russia while in MI5, the article shows that the Soviets possessed such power in the very heart of British Military Intelligence as to make their 'moles' minor and almost negligible factors.
4. The fact that a Jew had been able to coerce Military Intelligence by brazenly threatening to disclose to the Soviets whatever the agency chose to keep secret, and had actually done so with impunity, must deliver an almost galvanic shock to a sane Englishman. And the shock may induce in him the few minutes of cogitation needed to reach the conclusion that his nation had been ruined when the Jews used it as an instrument to destroy the only racially healthy nation in Europe and to begin the liquidation of Britain, now in progress. And there may still be manhood in England, to be aroused by that perception.
That is what the article really does. If you have a cynically suspicious mind, as I have said, you may suspect that the veteran of MI5 who contributed that article, in his own blandly journalistic way, at least tried to shoot down his Admiral Yamamoto and made a cover-story out of Peter Wright's banned book, perhaps with Peter Wright's blessing.
This article originally appeared in Liberty Bell magazine, published monthly by George P. Dietz from September 1973 to February 1999. For reprint information please write to Liberty Bell Publications, Post Office Box 21, Reedy WV 25270 USA.
Copyright ©2001 Kevin Alfred Strom. Back to Revilo P. Oliver Index